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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Nextel West Corporation ("Nextel"), a wireless 
telecommunications company, has attempted to gain 
permission from the defendants, Unity Township 
("Township") and its Zoning Hearing Board ("ZHB"), to build 
a 250-foot radio tower on private property in the Township, 
which is located southeast of Pittsburgh. On appeal to this 
Court, Nextel argues that the Township violated the federal 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA"), see 47 U.S.C. 
S 332(c)(7) (2000), in two ways: (1) its zoning ordinance has 
the "effect of prohibiting" all wireless telecommunications 
towers in the Township, and (2) the Township's disparate 
treatment of Nextel and a competitor constituted 
"unreasonable discrimination" under the TCA. 47 U.S.C. S 
332(c)(7)(B)(i). The District Court held that the case was 
mooted by an amendment of the original zoning ordinance 
and therefore granted the Township's motion for summary 
judgement on all claims. Because we hold that this case is 
not moot, we reverse and remand for adjudication of the 
merits of Nextel's two TCA claims. 
 




To create a wireless network that provides uninterrupted 
cell phone service for a given geographical region, a 
telecommunications company must stitch together a 
patchwork of transmission cells. An antenna is located in 
the approximate center of a cell and the antenna transmits 
wireless signals to and from cell phone users in that cell. 
Because an antenna transmits signals on a line-of-sight 
basis, it is typically mounted on a tower or other tall 
structure. The perimeter of each cell is shaped by the 
topography surrounding the antenna. Where the terrain is 
flat, a cell is circular and several miles in diameter. But the 
hilly terrain of western Pennsylvania distorts the shape and 
shrinks the size of a cell. The gaps these distortions create 
complicate the process of stitching together cells to blanket 
the targeted region. 
 
Because each wireless company is licensed by the 
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to use a 
different radio frequency, and because different companies 
use different transmission technologies, each wireless 
provider must deploy its own network of antennae, spaced 
at intervals so that their cells interlock. Providers usually 
prefer to mount an antenna on a existing building or 
telecommunications tower. When no suitable buildings or 
towers are located in the area where an antennae is 
needed, a company must build a new tower to provide 
wireless service in that area. For a wireless provider, the 
absence of coverage over a high-use area (e.g. , a population 
cluster or major road) creates legal and commercial 
problems. In order to retain its FCC license for a region, a 
licensee must achieve quality coverage (defined by the 
industry as the absence of "dropped" calls) for a certain 
percentage of the region's population within a certain 
number of years after the license was granted; if the 
licensee fails to do so, it will forfeit its entire license. See 47 
C.F.R. S 90.685(d) (2002). In addition, the ability to provide 
uninterrupted coverage in high-use areas is considered 
essential for a wireless company to remain competitive in 
that region. 
 
In this case, Nextel had a significant gap in service along 
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a segment of U.S. Route 30, Unity's only major highway.1 In 
that area, there were no towers or other tall structures on 
which Nextel could co-locate a "viable" antenna, i.e., an 
antenna that would cover Nextel's gap along Route 30. 
Nextel therefore undertook a thorough search for a location 
where it could place a viable tower. 
 
The Township's original ordinance permitted 
telecommunications towers, inaptly categorized as"utility 
substations," only in manufacturing zones, and it limited 
these towers to 75 feet in height, well below the industry 
average in that region.2 See  App. at 1110. The parties 
agreed that no tower built in any of the manufacturing 
districts would be viable.3 Instead, Nextel identified a 
nearby 38-acre farm where a viable tower could be located. 
The farm site was in a residential zoning district, just 
beyond the edge of a manufacturing district. The site was 
near Route 30 and would adequately cover the gap. 
Moreover, it did not appear that this location would present 
any aviation problem. 
 
Nextel applied to the ZHB for a variance to locate a tower 
on the farm site. In July 1998, the ZHB denied the 
variance. Nextel also filed an exclusionary challenge with 
the ZHB attacking the ordinance's validity under the TCA 
and state law. Nextel contended that the ordinance 
effectively prohibited wireless telecommunications facilities 
in the Township. When the ZHB failed to respond, Nextel's 
exclusionary challenge was deemed denied. In September 
1998, days after Nextel's exclusionary challenge was 
denied, the Township settled a lawsuit filed by Sprint, a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A gap in service, i.e., an area not covered by wireless signals, 
results 
in dropped calls as callers enter the uncovered area. 
 
2. The average height of new cell towers in western Pennsylvania region 
is allegedly 100-150 feet. App. at 1059, 1064. 
 
3. Most districts were too close to the airport. Any tower in the 
airport's 
vicinity would require approval from the Federal Aviation Administration 
("FAA"), which was very unlikely, considering the height the tower would 
need to be to cover the service gap. See App. at 498-99. The remainder 
of the manufacturing districts were veiled from U.S. Route 30 by hills, 
and thus transmissions from a tower there would be topographically 
blocked. 
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competitor of Nextel, after a state court reversed the ZHB's 
denial of Sprint's variance. See Sprint Spectrum v. Unity 
Township, 80 Westmoreland L.J. 53 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 
1998). Sprint had sought to build a cell tower in a 
manufacturing district to cover a service gap in its network, 
but the proposed height of the tower (250 feet) far exceeded 
the ordinance's limit. In accordance with the settlement 
agreement, Sprint withdrew its exclusionary challenge 
against the ordinance, and the Township issued a variance 
that allowed Sprint to build its 250-foot tower. 
 
Nextel timely filed two TCA actions based on these two 
denials from the ZHB, and the District Court consolidated 
the two actions. While this litigation was pending before the 
District Court, the Township amended its original 
ordinance in February 1999 in three ways. First, the 
amended ordinance allowed wireless telecommunications 
towers in two additional zoning districts (agricultural and 
conservation, but still not residential). Second, it permitted 
towers as a "special exception" if the site in question 
satisfied certain criteria. See App. at 1201-06. Third, it 
raised the maximum height of towers in manufacturing 
districts to 180 feet and in agricultural and conservation 
districts to 150 feet (plus 50 feet more if the setback was 
sufficient). Nextel argues, however, that the criteria to 
qualify a tower site for a special exception are so 
burdensome and the additional districts so remote from 
Route 30 that, in actuality, Nextel's ability to obtain 
approval for a viable tower was effectively unaltered by the 
amendment. 
 
After the amendment, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. Nextel argued that the summary 
judgment record showed that (1) the original ordinance was 
impermissibly exclusionary under state law, (2) the original 
ordinance violated the federal TCA by effectively prohibiting 
wireless telecommunications services, and (3) the Township 
violated the TCA by unreasonably discriminating in favor of 
Sprint. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
the Township. It held that Nextel's claims under the TCA 
were mooted by the 1999 amendment of the ordinance. 
Absent any allegation of diversity jurisdiction, the District 
Court found it had no supplemental jurisdiction over the 
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This appeal presents three primary issues: (1) whether 
the 1999 amendment to the ordinance renders Nextel's two 
TCA claims either moot or unripe, (2) whether the 
ordinance has the "effect of prohibiting" wireless facilities 
and thus violates the TCA, and (3) whether the Township 
violated the TCA by "unreasonably discriminat[ing]" against 
Nextel.4 Nextel requests an injunction directing the 
Township to permit Nextel to build a 250-foot tower on the 
farm site. The District Court's opinion addressed only the 
first issue (mootness) and found it dispositive. We hold that 
the 1999 amendment to the Township's ordinance did not 
moot either of Nextel's two claims under the TCA. We 
therefore remand the case to the District Court to 
adjudicate the merits of Nextel's two TCA claims and any 





The Constitution permits a federal court to exercise 
jurisdiction only over cases or controversies. See U.S. 
Const., art. III. If a claim no longer presents a live case or 
controversy, the claim is moot and the federal court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear it. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
750 (1984). This requirement must be met "through all 
stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate." 
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). 
If the claim is based on a statute or ordinance that is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The TCA provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
       The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of 
       personal wireless service facilities by any State or local 
government 
       or instrumentality thereof -- (I) shall not unreasonably 
discriminate 
       among providers of functionally equivalent services; and (II) shall 
not 
       prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of 
personal 
       wireless services. 
 
47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 
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amended after the litigation has begun, the amendment 
may or may not moot the claim, depending on the impact 
of the amendment. 
 
On the one hand, if an amendment removes those 
features in the statute being challenged by the claim, any 
claim for injunctive relief "`becomes moot as to those 
features."' Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman , 237 F.3d 186, 
194 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that facial constitutional 
challenges -- on equal protection and other grounds -- 
were mooted by an amendment that significantly broadened 
the statute's scope and thus alleviated these facial claims) 
(quoting Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 
(11th Cir. 1992); see also Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist 
Church, 404 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1972) (holding that a facial 
challenge was mooted by an amendment that substantially 
altered the objectionable statutory provision). Similarly, if 
the amendment provides sufficient relief to the plaintiff, the 
claim becomes moot. See U.S. Dept. of Treasury v. Galioto, 
477 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1986) (holding that an amendment 
that gave plaintiffs a new administrative remedy mooted 
constitutional challenges regarding equal protection and 
irrebuttable presumptions); Black United Fund of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Kean, 763 F.2d 156, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(holding plaintiff's claims were mooted by an amendment 
because the "raison d'etre for the injunction no longer 
exists," and noting that the amendment "will give plaintiff 
substantially the relief it sought in the district court"). 
 
On the other hand, an amendment does not moot the 
claim if the updated statute differs only insignificantly from 
the original. See Northeastern Florida Chapter of the 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993) (rejecting a misinterpretation of 
the holding in City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 
U.S. 283 (1982), that would permit "a defendant[to] moot 
a case by repealing the challenged statute and replacing it 
with one that differs only in some insignificant respect"). A 
claim is not mooted by the amendment if the "gravamen of 
petitioner's complaint" remains because, although the new 
ordinance "may disadvantage [plaintiffs] to a lesser degree 
than the old one," still "it disadvantages them in the same 
fundamental way." Id.; see also Coalition for the Abolition of 
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Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 
1313-15 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding the challenged provisions 
of the old ordinance "have not been sufficiently altered [by 
the amendment] so as to eliminate the issues raised" and 
that the violations alleged under the old ordinance could be 
reasonably expected to continue under the new ordinance); 
Naturist Soc'y, 958 F.2d at 1520 ("Where a superceding 
statute leaves objectionable features of the prior law 
substantially undisturbed, the case is not moot. . .. To the 
extent that those [challenged] features remain in place, and 
changes in the law have not so fundamentally altered the 
statutory framework as to render the original controversy a 
mere abstraction, the case is not moot."). 
 
In Khodara, we held that, although facial challenges were 
mooted by the amendment, the as-applied challenges were 
not moot because relief was still available for these claims, 
which the amendment had not redressed.5  See Khodara, 
237 F.3d at 195-96. In Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216 (3d 
Cir. 1993), we held the case was not mooted by the 
promulgation of new regulations because they gave 
plaintiffs "only some, not all, of the relief they sought." 12 
F.3d at 1233. Although the plaintiffs had requested relief in 
the form of new regulations, they had also sought a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Khodara, we determined the mootness of plaintiff's claims according 
to the availability of relief after the statute was amended. After the 
statute was amended, the prospective declaratory and injunctive relief 
sought through the facial challenges was moot, but the damages sought 
through the as-applied challenges saved these latter claims from 
mootness. The plaintiff's "claim for damages for the past application [of 
the original statute] invests it with a continuing, concrete stake in the 
outcome of this litigation that has not been redressed by the passage of 
the [recent] Amendment." Id. at 196. 
 
We reject the Township's mistaken argument that seizes on the 
existence of a claim for damages as the litmus test for mootness. The 
Township's contention -- because Nextel seeks only injunctive relief and 
not damages, the 1999 amendment moots Nextel's claims -- 
misinterprets our reasoning in Khodara. It was the continuing 
availability of relief, unredressed by the amendment, that kept the 
controversy alive in Khodara. Similarly, the relief requested by Nextel -- 
declaring the ordinance invalid and/or enjoin the Township to permit 
Nextel to build its farm-site tower -- remain meaningful and available 
after the 1999 amendment. 
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separate form of injunctive relief that was unaddressed and 
was therefore not mooted by these new regulations. See id. 
 
1. Claim of Prohibitive Effect. Applying this case law to 
Nextel's first TCA claim, we hold that the Township's 
amendment did not sufficiently alter the ordinance to moot 
the question whether Unity's ordinance effectively prohibits 
wireless facilities. Even though the amendment did, on its 
face, loosen the zoning restrictions on wireless towers, the 
controversy over its effect remains alive, and injunctive 
relief remains available. According to Nextel, both before 
and after the amendment, the ordinance effectively 
prohibited Nextel from locating a tower in any viable 
location. Nextel argues that the changes introduced by the 
amendment -- an increase in height limits, the addition of 
two types of zoning districts, and the special exception 
procedure -- still provided no feasible location for a tower 
that could cover the gap in service. Under the Khodara 
analysis, the challenged feature of the original ordinance 
(i.e., its allegedly prohibitive effect) was not removed by the 
amendment. 
 
In the language of Northeastern Florida Chapter , both 
before and after the amendment, "the gravamen" of Nextel's 
complaint remained: the allegedly prohibitive effect of the 
Township's ordinance still violated the TCA. 508 U.S. at 
662. Both before and after amendment, Nextel was 
allegedly "disadvantag[ed] in the same fundamental way": it 
still cannot place a viable tower anywhere in the Township. 
Id. As for the continuing availability of requested relief, 
crucial in Rosetti, the amendment in no way redressed 
Nextel's request for site-specific, injunctive relief. 
 
In holding that Nextel's TCA claims were moot, the 
District Court did not compare the effect of the original 
ordinance and the amended ordinance. It did not discuss 
whether and to what extent the allegedly prohibitive effect 
of the original ordinance had been altered by the 
amendment. Instead, the Court reasoned that because the 
amendment added something to the ordinance-- namely, 
criteria under which towers could be permitted as special 
exceptions -- Nextel's claims had become moot. See App. at 
19-20. The District Court relied on Burke v. Barnes, 479 
U.S. 361, 363 (1987) and Diffenderfer for the proposition 
 
                                9 
  
that a statute's expiration or repeal deprives the plaintiff of 
injunctive and declaratory relief. But that rule is 
inapplicable here, because the original ordinance was 
merely amended. More appropriate for these facts is the 
mootness inquiry from Northeastern Florida Chapter and 
Khodara, i.e., whether the amendment sufficiently altered 
or removed the challenged aspects of the original legislation 
to moot the underlying claims. 
 
2. Claim of Unreasonable Discrimination. In addition to its 
claim that the Township's ordinance violated the TCA by 
effectively prohibiting cell towers, Nextel also claimed that 
the defendants violated the TCA by discriminating against 
it and in favor of a competitor, Sprint. We hold that this 
claim is also not moot. The District Court failed to make a 
distinction between Nextel's two separate TCA claims. The 
District Court's opinion did not explain how a change in the 
text of an ordinance could moot a claim of past 
discriminatory conduct. 
 
Nextel seeks a remedy for the Township's decision to 
deny its variance request, while granting a similar variance 
to Sprint. The variance permitted Sprint to build its tower 
in a manner otherwise impermissible under either the 
original or amended ordinance. Even if the amendment had 
mooted Nextel's first claim by purging the ordinance of its 
allegedly prohibitive effect, the amendment in no way 
altered Nextel's claim of unreasonably discriminatory 





Although the District Court did not discuss ripeness, the 
appellees have urged us to affirm the decision of the 
District Court on the alternative ground that Nextel's claims 
are not ripe. We are convinced, however, that Nextel's TCA 
claims are ripe for adjudication on the merits by the 
District Court. We reject the Township's argument that 
Nextel's claims are unripe because Nextel has not yet 
applied for a permit or variance under the amended 
ordinance. We find the Township's position -- that any 
amendment to a zoning ordinance forces an applicant to 
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reapply in order for its TCA claim to ripen -- extreme and 
contrary to precedent. 
 
The Township's position would enable a municipality to 
trap telecommunications plaintiffs in a litigation limbo 
between mootness and unripeness, frustrating the TCA's 
purpose. Under the Township's approach, as long as a 
municipality passed an insignificant amendment after each 
TCA action was filed, it could block telecommunications 
plaintiffs' access to court, even though expedited review in 
federal court is the benefit Congress expressly intended to 
confer on wireless providers by enacting the TCA. See 47 
U.S.C. S 332 (c)(7)(B)(v). The Supreme Court squarely 
rejected this theory when discussing mootness in 
Northeastern Florida Chapter. See 508 U.S. at 662 (rejecting 
a rule that would permit "a defendant [to] moot a case by 
repealing the challenged statute and replacing it with one 
that differs only in some insignificant respect"). We thus 




On remand, the District Court must weigh the merits of 
two TCA claims that require separate analyses but work 
together to effectuate the purpose of the statute. 6 First, the 
District Court must determine whether the ordinance had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 seeks to create "a pro- 
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to rapidly 
accelerate private sector deployment of advanced telecommunication and 
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all 
telecommunications markets to competition." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104- 
458 at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124. It seeks to 
balance this goal against the legitimate concerns of state and local 
governments in regulating the siting of wireless facilities. See H.R. 
Conf. 
Rep. No. 104-204, at 94-95 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 61. 
 
Though Nextel makes two separate claims under the TCA, the two 
provisions from which these claims derive -- effectively prohibit and 
unreasonably discriminate -- work together to promote the expansion of 
wireless telecommunications networks by protecting telecommunications 
plaintiffs. 
 
The first provision (forbidding ordinances which effectively prohibit 
wireless facilities) aims to open up municipalities to wireless providers 
generally. The second provision (against unreasonable discrimination) 
seeks to ensure that, once the municipality allows the first wireless 
provider to enter, the municipality will not unreasonably exclude 
subsequent providers who similarly wish to enter and create a 
competitive market in telecommunications services. 
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a prohibitive effect on wireless facilities. Second, it must 
decide whether the Township unreasonably discriminated 
against Nextel. 
 
1. Prohibitive effect. The TCA states that ordinances are 
actionable if they "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting 
the provision of personal wireless services." 47 U.S.C. S 332 
(c)(7)(B)(i) (2000). The statute does not define what 
constitutes prohibitive effect, but case law provides 
guidance. We have interpreted the "effect of prohibiting" 
clause to include a situation in which a zoning ordinance 
causes "significant gaps" in wireless coverage, and we have 
suggested that a "significant commuter highway" would 
present such a gap. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Ho-ho-kus, 197 F.3d 
64, 70 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding the phrase "effect of 
prohibiting" to mean "more than simply ensuring that 
personal wireless services are available somewhere in the 
relevant jurisdiction"). 
 
A recent decision by this Court involved facts similar to 
those now before us.7 In APT Pittsburgh Ltd. Partnership v. 
Penn Township, 196 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 1999), we adopted a 
two-prong test to determine whether an ordinance had the 
prohibitive effect that the TCA forbids.8  See 196 F.3d at 
480-81. To satisfy the first prong, "the provider must show 
that its [proposed] facility will fill an existing significant gap 
... in the service available to remote users." Id. at 480. We 
defined this prong as requiring a gap from a user's 
perspective, rather than a particular provider's perspective. 
Thus, this prong focuses on whether any provider is 
covering the gap, instead of whether the gap exists only in, 
for example, Nextel's service. A provider must "include 
evidence that the area the new facility will serve is not 
already served by another provider."9  Id. In the present 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The wireless provider suffered from a gap in coverage along a hilly 
township's major highway corridor. It unsuccessfully sought a variance 
to locate a tower in a rural area (zoned residential). A zoning amendment 
then restricted wireless telecommunications towers to three 
manufacturing districts, none of which were technologically feasible and 
available for the provider. See APT Pittsburgh , 196 F.3d at 472. 
 
8. The test is also employed in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 
630, 639 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 
9. However, if an applicant is denied a permit to cover an area when 
other providers have been approved, this may violate a different 
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case, the relevant testimony on this issue is scant and 
conclusory, but it suggests that a gap existed for all 
providers and not only Nextel.10 In oral argument, counsel 
for Nextel asserted that no provider covers this gap but did 
not refer to any evidence. On remand, the District Court 
should make a factual determination as to whether this 
service gap existed for all or for Nextel alone. 
 
The second prong of the prohibitive-effect test in APT 
Pittsburgh requires the telecommunications plaintiff to show 
"that the manner in which it proposes to fill the significant 
gap in service is the least intrusive on the values that 
denial sought to serve." Id. The court offered examples of a 
good-faith effort to find and evaluate less intrusive 
alternatives: consideration of other sites, other system 
designs, other tower designs, existing structures, etc. See 
id. Whether the farm site is the least intrusive means to fill 
the gap in service is a decision for the District Court on 
remand. We note that Nextel put forward testimony 
suggesting that its proposal is relatively unintrusive.11 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
provision in the TCA: unreasonable discrimination. Both the Willoth and 
APT Pittsburgh courts note that, even if a particular provider's gap is 
already serviced by another provider, "the TCA may invalidate the denial 
of a variance [to the new entrant] if it has the effect of unreasonably 
discriminating between providers." APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480 n.8. 
 
10. According to the affidavit of Nextel's expert witness, Mr. Monfredi 
(an 
outside consultant and engineer) concluded that, after conducting tests 
using multiple sites and frequencies, "no licensed provider of wireless 
telecommunications services, regardless of the frequency at which it 
operates, can provide functional service to the Unity Corridor and to the 
Unity Communities if such carrier is required to strictly comply with 
either the 1998 Ordinance or the Subsequent [1999] Ordinance." App. at 
1379-80. 
 
The Township did not refute this statement with any evidence. Instead, 
it objected that Monfredi's tests insufficiently explore possibilities 
under 
the amendment's increased height allowances. 
 
At minimum, the record shows that not a single cell tower has been 
permitted in the Township under the ordinance. The sole tower (Sprint's) 
was built pursuant to a variance from limits imposed by the ordinance, 
granted only as part of a settlement. See App. at 1188, 1191. 
 
11. Nextel's expert witness stated that "where collocation on existing 
structures is not feasible, it is commonplace for municipalities to prefer 
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record lacks a direct response from the Township regarding 
intrusiveness; instead the Township referred (but did not 
commit itself) to an alternative proposal to build two or 
three shorter towers.12 
 
2. Unreasonable discrimination. Independent of Nextel's 
claim of prohibitive effect, Nextel makes a claim of 
unreasonable discrimination under the TCA. The TCA 
requires that the "regulation of the placement, 
construction, and modification of personal wireless service 
facilities by [local governments] ... shall not unreasonably 
discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent 
services." 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i). Another two-prong test 
emerges from this provision. See APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P'ship 
v. Lower Yoder Township, 111 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674-75 
(W.D. Pa. 2000). In this analysis, the first prong asks 
whether the relevant providers are "functionally equivalent." 
47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i). If they are, then the second 
prong asks whether the governmental body "unreasonably 
discriminate[d] among providers." Id.  In the instant case, 
the record clearly shows that Sprint and Nextel are 
functionally equivalent.13 On remand, therefore, the District 
Court should examine whether the Township's 




the construction of a single tower to multiple towers. This preference 
holds even if the single tower must be built to a greater height than 
would be necessary with additional sites." App. at 1387-88. 
 
12. Nextel's expert witness testified that the use of multiple sites "has 
many limitations that make it impractical." App. at 1382. 
 
13. We think the equivalency of function relates to the 
telecommunications services the entity provides, not to the technical 
particularities (design, technology, or frequency) of its operations. The 
TCA clearly does not force competing wireless providers to adopt 
identical technology or design nor does it compel them to fit their 
networks of antennae into a uniform, rigid honeycomb of interlocking 
cells. Indeed, the FCC's assignment of a different frequency and signal 
strength to each licensee renders such uniformity impossible. In this 
region, Sprint and Nextel provide the same service-- personal wireless 
communications services to remote users -- and therefore are 
functionally equivalent. 
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To preserve the ability of local governments and zoning 
boards to take into account the uniqueness of land, the 
TCA "explicitly contemplates that some discrimination ... is 
allowed. Any discrimination need only be reasonable." AT&T 
Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach , 155 
F.3d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Sprint Spectrum, L.P. 
v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 638 (2d Cir. 1999). In a footnote 
in APT Pittsburgh, we stated that relief under the TCA's 
discrimination provision "will require a showing that the 
other provider is similarly situated, i.e., that the`structure, 
placement or cumulative impact' of the existing facilities 
makes them as or more intrusive than the proposed 
facility." 196 F.3d at 480 n.8. Discrimination may be 
impermissible where a municipality favors one provider by 
permitting it to locate in a particular area at the exclusion 
of others, thereby creating unfair competitive advantage. 
See Western PCS II, Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth., 
957 F. Supp. 1230, 1237-38 (D.N.M. 1997). 
 
The record before us is insufficient to determine 
conclusively whether Sprint and Nextel were indeed 
similarly situated and whether the Township's 
discrimination was unreasonable. Thus far, Nextel has 
shown strong similarities between the two situations. 
Initially, both Sprint and Nextel had a service gap in the 
Township, both proposed to build a 250-foot tower, both 
were denied a variance, both appealed the ZHB's denial, 
and both filed exclusionary challenges against the 
Township. However, after the Court of Common Pleas of 
Westmoreland County reversed the denial of Sprint's 
variance, the Township decided to settle with Sprint. 
Pursuant to the agreement, the Township gave Sprint the 
site-specific relief it requested (a variance to build its 250- 
foot tower) and Sprint withdrew its exclusionary challenge. 
By contrast, Nextel received no variance and no explanation 
as to why its exclusionary challenge was denied only days 
before the Township settled with Sprint. If, on remand, the 
District Court can find no reasonable basis for this 




For the reasons explained above, the order of the District 
Court granting summary judgment in favor of the Township 
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is REVERSED and the case is remanded for three fact- 
specific determinations: (1) whether the service gap was 
suffered by all wireless providers or only Nextel, (2) whether 
erecting a tower at the farm site proposed by Nextel was the 
least intrusive means for covering the gap in service along 
U.S. Route 30, and (3) whether the Township's 
discrimination between Nextel and Sprint was 
unreasonable. If the District Court finds that no provider 
was covering the service gap and that the farm site was the 
least intrusive means of covering that gap, or it finds that 
the Township's discrimination was unreasonable, then 
Nextel is entitled to remedies available under the TCA. 
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